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Dense, stimulating, and packed with insights, the book is fine for specialists
and can be handled by graduate and upper-division undergraduate students.
While the author has more confidence in assessing the "strategic personahty"
of opponents than is warranted, and sees proliferation and terrorism as urgent
problems yet leans toward strategies he admits may work badly or too slowly,
these are minor drawbacks in a book that illuminates the heart of contempo-
rary American national security policy.
PATRICK M. MORGAN
University of California, Irvine
Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong
(and How We the People Can Correct It) by Sanford Levinson. New
York, Oxford University Press, 2006. 181 pp. $28.00.
Sanford Levinson is shocked to find that the American Constitution is un-
democratic. Features like federalism and separation of powers are, upon close
inspection, httle more than obstructions to effective majority rule. Whatever
sense our institutions made in the eighteenth century, they serve no defensible
purpose today.
In lively and accessible prose, Levinson offers cogent arguments as to
why the key structural features of the Constitution—especially represen-
tation on a two-senators-for-every-state basis and the electoral college—
cannot be reconciled with democratic principles, given population ratios like
those of California, Texas, or New York to those of Wyoming, Vermont, or
North Dakota.
Some of the defects catalogued by Levinson could be fixed by amend-
ment. For example, the rules governing the filling of House and Senate vacan-
cies appear to assume that such vacancies will occur only sporadically. In the
event of a terrorist attack or other catastrophe that caused wholesale death
or incapacitation, there would be no functioning Congress for weeks or even
months, during which time the executive would probably assume emergency
powers. Levinson accordingly endorses an amendment to empower states
to temporarily replace their representatives and senators by means other
than election.
Creative solutions can be found to other problems without resort to con-
stitutional amendment. For instance, Levinson touts a movement that would
commit states with a majority of electoral votes to assigning their electors to the
winner of the national popular vote. If embodied in an enforceable interstate
compact approved by Congress, such an agreement would render the electoral
college a meaningless formality.
Likewise, Levinson prefers fixed terms for Supreme Court justices to our
current system of hfe tenure. He approvingly cites the analysis of Steven G.
Calabresi and James Lindgren ("Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life
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Tenure Reconsidered" in Paul Carrington and Roger C. Cramton, eds..
Reforming the Court: Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices, Durham,
North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2006, pp. 15-98), who argue that
justices can be made to serve fixed terms without amending the Constitution;
after their terms are finished, justices would become lower federal court
judges if they chose not to retire.
Yet there is no sub-constitutional fix for Levinson's core problem, the
enormous over-representation of the residents of small states in the national
government. Worse, constitutional amendment is impossible as a practical
matter because, by the terms of Article V, any amendment requires the con-
currence of three-fourths of the states, and one that tinkers with the Senate,
requires unanimity.
Levinson strives to avoid offering a counsel of despair, and thus in his
concluding chapter, he approves Akhil Reed Amar's suggestion that the Con-
stitution permits a national referendum to ratify amendments proposed by a
constitutional convention, even though Article V describes no such procedure.
Amar's idea cannot be taken literally. There would be little point in specifying
supermajority or unanimity requirements for amendments if those require-
ments could be circumvented by an unnamed majoritarian procedure. At
most, Amar shows that the people retain the moral right, not the legal right,
to bypass Article V.
Levinson's main target throughout the book is unthinking worship of the
Constitution we have, and he consistently hits that target. Yet, he also dis-
counts what he deems elitist fears that the old Constitution could be replaced
by something far worse.
Moreover, Levinson may unwittingly exacerbate what he regards as one of
the Constitution's most dangerous features. The president, he says, "is too
unconstrained and can all too easily engage in dramatic exertions of power,
especially in the realm of foreign policy" (p. 108). As Levinson continually
notes, however, constraint comes not only from text, but also from popular
understanding. By urging the circumvention of so fundamental a provision as
Article V, Levinson gives comfort to those who would free the president of
whatever bounds can plausibly be found in the old Constitution.
MICHAEL C. DORF
Columbia University
Strategic Selection: Presidential Nomination of Snpreme Conrt Jnstices
from Herbert Hoover Through George W. Bnsh by Christine L.
Nemacheck. Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 2007. 187
pp. $35.00.
By the time Potter Stewart announced his retirement from the U.S. Supreme
Court in June of 1981, the administration of Ronald Reagan had compiled
